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This  paper  provides  a  comparative  analysis  of 
monetary  policy  in Australia  and  the  United  States. 
It concentrates  on  the  day-to-day  conduct  of policy 
and  on  the  influence  that  the  structure  of overnight 
money  markets  has on the  transmission  of monetary 
policy  through  open  market  operations.  The  regu- 
latory  structure  of  any  market  affects  the  behavior 
of  agents  who  trade  in that  market  and,  therefore, 
can  also influence  the  results  of government  actions. 
In particular,  the  efficiency  of monetary  control  may 
depend  on  the  rules  and  institutional  arrangements 
that  characterize  a country’s  overnight  money  market. 
The  analysis  indicates  that  there  are  significant 
institutional  differences  between  the  Australian  and 
United  States  money  markets  and  that  these  differ- 
ences  are  important  in determining  the  relative  effi- 
ciency  of monetary  control  under  different  operating 
procedures. 
There  are three  major  elements  that  differ between 
the  United  States  and the  Australian  money  markets. 
One  is  the  nature  of  reserve  requirements,  while 
another  involves  the  lending  procedures  used  by the 
respective  central  banks.  The  third  is that  certain 
money  market  dealers  bank  at the  Reserve  Bank  of 
Australia  rather  than  with  private  banks.  These 
differences  affect  monetary  control.  Further,  the 
interaction  between  the  structure  of  the  money 
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market  and  monetary  control  is  influenced  by  use 
of  the  interest  rate  as  the  instrument  of  monetary 
policy  in  both  countries. 
To  compare  the  overnight  money  markets,  it  is 
essential  to define  terminology  and explain  their  struc- 
ture.  This  is done  in Section  II.  Since  the  structure 
of the  U.S.  money  market  is relatively  familiar  and 
is examined  in depth  elsewhere,  the  discussion  will 
focus  primarily  on Australia.’  Section  III presents  the 
mechanics  of open  market  operations  in Australia and 
describes  the  operating  procedures  of  the  Reserve 
Bank  of  Australia.  Based  on  this  description,  a 
theoretical  model  examining  the  efficiency  of 
monetary  control  is explored  in Section  IV.  A brief 
summary  is given  in  Section  V. 
II. 
The  Official  Money  Market  in  Australia 
Overview 
This  section  describes  the  structure  of the  official 
money  market  in Australia.  It also examines  the  roles 
of the  major  participants-dealers,  trading  banks,  and 
the  Reserve  Bank-and  describes  how  funds  are 
distributed  among  them.  Various  similarities  and 
differences  between  this market  and  the  U.S.  federal 
funds  market  are highlighted.  A basic  comparison  in 
terminology  is  summarized  in  Table  I,  while  the 
major  institutional  differences  are  summarized  in 
Table  II. 
Market Structure 
The  official  money  market  in  Australia  is  basi- 
cally  analogous  to  the  U.S.  federal  funds  market. 
It  allocates  funds  that  receive  same-day  credit  in 
i  For  a  detailed  treatment  of  the  U.S.  money  market,  see 
Cook  and  Rowe  (1986).  In particular  the  article  by Goodfriend 
and  Whelpley  makes  an in-depth  study  of the  federal  funds  and 
overnight  RP  market. 
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same-day  credit  in  accounts  held 
with  central  bank 
Table  I 
TERMINOLOGY 
Australia 
Official  money  market 
United  States 
Federal  funds  market 
Institutions  that  deal  directly 
with  the  central  bank 
Authorized  dealers  and 
occasionally  trading 
banks 
Primary  dealers,  some 
of  which  are  banks 
Inventory  of  same-day  funds 
Reserves  held  at  central 
account 
Bank  loans  to  dealers 
Statutory  reserve 
deposits  CSRD)  and  exchange 
settlement  funds 
Excess  reserves 
Reserve  bank  balance 
Methods  of  central  bank 
lending 
Rediscounting  of 
government  securities 
and  lender-of-last-resort 
loans  (LLR)  to  authorized 
Discount  window 
borrowing 
dealers 
accounts  held  by  trading  banks  and  dealers  at  the 
Reserve  Bank  of  Australia.  These  accounts,  which 
are  used  for  clearing  funds,  are  called  exchange 
settlement  accounts.  Australia  also  has  an  un- 
official money  market  that  handles  all money  market 
transactions  in which  banks  do not  receive  same-day 
credit  in  their  exchange  settlement  accounts. 
In short,  Australia  has two types  of funds.  The  first 
consists  of  same-day  funds  or  exchange  settlement 
funds  that  accrue  to  exchange  settlement  accounts 
at the  Reserve  Bank.  These  include  direct  dealings 
with  the  Reserve  Bank,  transactions  with  autho- 
rized  dealers,  and yesterday’s  check  clearings.  Funds 
of  the  second  type  are  those  transferred  by  bank 
checks.  These  are  next-day  funds  because  checks 
presented  against  banks  in  Australia  are  cleared 
through  the  Australian  Clearing  House  and  do  not 
affect  the  exchange  settlement  accounts  of banks  until 
the  following  morning. 
Participants in the Official Money  Market 
De&~  Dealers  play  a pivotal  role  in  the  daily 
functioning  of  the  official  money  market.  For  one 
thing,  the  Reserve  Bank  deals almost  exclusively  with 
authorized  dealers  so that,  with the  exception  of redis- 
counting,  all  movements  in  same-day  funds  are 
initiated  through  the  accounts  of  dealers  at  the 
Reserve  Bank  of  Australia.  Another  reason  relates 
to  the  timing  convention  for  debiting  and  crediting 
the  exchange  settlement  accounts  of dealers.  These 
accounts  are credited  and debited  on a same-day  basis 
which  gives  dealers  the  central  role  in  distributing 
exchange  settlement  funds  throughout  the  banking 
system.  The  interbank  market  also plays  a role,  but 
it  is  only  through  transactions  with  dealers  that 
systemwide  shortages  or  excesses  can  be  trans- 
ferred  from  one  day  to the  next.  That  official  money 
market  dealers  bank  at the  Reserve  Bank  of Australia 
and  that  their  transactions  receive  same-day  credit 
are the  key  features  distinguishing  the  Australian  from 
the  U.S.  money  markets. 
The  timing  convention  of crediting  exchange  set:- 
tlement  accounts  of dealers  on  the  same  day  allows 
the  banking  system  to transfer  same-day  funds  from 
one  day to the  next  through  the  use  of interday  float. 
This  is done  by holding  a stock  of loans with  dealers. 
Because  transactions  with  dealers  receive  same-day 
credit  while  checkable  funds  take  one  day  to  clear, 
loans  to  official  money  market  dealers  occupy  a 
special  place  in the  operation  of  the  official  money 
market.  If the  banking  system  as a whole  has  insuf- 
ficient  exchange  settlement  funds,  it can  call in loans 
to  dealers.  (Note  that  dealers  cannot  make  loans  to 
banks.)  The  banking  system  gets  immediate  credit 
on  this  transaction  and  the  transaction  also  leaves 
dealers  short  of  same-day  funds.  Unlike  banks, 
however,  dealers  can  sell  a government  security  to 
the  nonbank  public  and  receive  same-day  funds. 
Although  dealers  receive  same-day  funds,  the  check. 
written  to the  dealer  will not  be  cleared  until  tomor-, 
row  and  will not  affect  the  balances  in the  banking 
system’s  exchange  settlement  accounts  until  then. 
Essentially,  the  timing  convention  allows  the  bank- 
ing  system  to  make  use  of float  (that  is, cash  items 
in the  process  of collection)  by transferring  exchange 
settlement  funds  through  time.  This  also implies  that 
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MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS  OF OVERNIGHT  MONEY  MARKETS  FOR  RESERVABLE  FUNDS 
Australia  United  States 
Reserve Requirements 
Current  reserve  requirements  are 
based  on  last  month’s  deposits  and 
are  therefore  lagged.  These  require- 
ments  are  held  in  a  special  account 
called  a  statutory  reserve  deposit 
account  (SRD)  and  earn  a  below-market 
rate  of  interest. 
Reserve  requirements  in  the  United  States 
are  almost  contemporaneous.  Required 
reserves  for  a  two-week  maintenance 
period  ending  on  a  Wednesday  are 
based  on  deposits  for  the  two-week 
period  ending  on  a  Monday. 
Clearing  Balances 
Balances  held  at  the  Reserve  Bank 
for  the  purpose  of  clearing  checks  are 
called  exchange  settlement  funds.  The 
exchange  settlement  account  pays  no 
interest  and  can  not  be  negative 
at  the  end  of  the  day. 
Banks  clear  funds  through  their  reserve 
account  at  the  Fed.  This  account  can 
not  have  a  negative  balance  at  the  end 
of  the  day. 
Dealers 
There  are  9  authorized  dealers  in  There  are  37  primary  dealers  in  the 
Australia.  They  bank  at  the  Reserve  United  States,  some  of  which  are  banks. 
Bank  of  Australia.  Nonbank  dealers  do  not  bank  with  the  Fed. 
Central  Bank Lending 
There  are  two  forms  of  lending,  one  is 
to  authorized  dealers  through  a  line  of 
credit  and  is  referred  to  as  a  lender-of- 
last-resort  loan  (LLRI.  The  other  is 
through  rediscounting  government  secur- 
ities  (CGS).  This  is  not  technically  a 
loan,  but  is  analytically  equivalent  to 
a  loan  over  the  securities’  remaining 
maturity.  Both  means  of  acquiring  funds 
usually  involve  rates  that  are  above  market 
rates. 
bank  loans  to  dealers  are  a  source  of  same-day  li- 
quidity  to  the  banking  system  and  serve  the  same 
purpose  as excess  reserves  do  in the  United  States. 
I  Trading Banks  Trading  banks  in  Australia  are 
banks  that  are authorized  to clear  checks.  Nonbanks 
are  allowed  only  indirect  access  to  the  check  clear- 
ing  system  either  by  holding  accounts  with  trading 
banks  or  by  having  an  agency  arrangement  with  a 
trading  bank.  For  understanding  the  workings  of the 
official  market,  however,  there  is no  loss  in assum- 
ing  that  all checks  are  issued  by  trading  banks. 
The  important  regulations  that  affect  bank  behavior 
in  the  official  market  are  the  structure  of  reserve 
requirements,  access  to  rediscounting  (discussed 
later),  and  the  same-day  availability  of funds  lent  to 
dealers.  Banks  maintain  required  reserves  in a special 
The  Fed  lends  money  to  banks  through  its 
discount  window.  These  loans  are 
typically  made  at  a  subsidized  rate  and 
therefore  involve  some  sort  of  rationing 
process. 
account  called  a  statutory  reserve  deposit  account 
(SRD).  These  reserves  are  based  on  last  months 
deposits  and  earn  a below-market  rate  of  interest, 
implying  that  the  SRD  requirement  acts  as a tax  on 
the  banking  system.  For  check  clearing  purposes 
banks  also maintain  an exchange  settlement  account 
whose  balance  cannot  be  negative  at the  end  of the 
day.  This  is equivalent  to requiring  that  banks  meet 
their  reserve  requirement  on  a  day-to-day  basis. 
In the  United  States,  banks  need  only  meet  their 
reserve  requirements  on average  and,  therefore,  have 
some  flexibility  in determining  the  profile  of their  re- 
quired  reserve  balances.  In Australia,  flexibility  arises 
through  the  use  of float  produced  by  the  differential 
timing  in  debiting  and  crediting  the  accounts  of 
dealers  and  banks. 
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of the  Reserve  Bank of Australia is conducted  through 
its  exchange  settlement  position  with  the  banking 
system.  To  influence  the  cash  position  of the  bank- 
ing  system  the  Reserve  Bank  actively  uses  open 
market  operations  consisting  of  outright  purchases 
and  sales  of government  securities  and  repurchase 
and  reverse  repurchase  agreements.  As  with  most 
central  banks  that  essentially  use  an  interest  rate 
instrument,  the  volume  of trading  is many  times  the 
actual  change  in portfolios.  For  example,  in 198.5186 
the  Reserve  Banks  gross  purchases  amounted  to 
approximately  $29.7  billion while  its gross  sales were 
approximately  $28.4  billion,  yielding  only  a small net 
increase  in its portfolio.  The  same  type  of financial 
churning  typifies  U.S.  experience.  As  documented 
by  Friedman  (1982)  and  by  Levin  and  Meulendyke 
(1982),  the  Federal  Reserve  made  gross  transactions 
on  its own  account  of $393  billion  while  only  adding 
$4.5  billion  to  its  portfolio. 
Open  market  operations  in  Australia  are  almost 
exclusively  implemented  through  transactions  with 
authorized  dealers,  although  in unusual  circumstances 
the  Reserve  Bank  may  transact  directly  with  banks. 
Unlike  open  market  operations  conducted  by  the 
Fed,  those  carried  out  by  the  Reserve  Bank  of 
Australia  do not  supply  same-day  funds  to the  bank- 
ing system.  This  is a direct  result  of dealers  banking 
with the  Reserve  Bank.  In the  United  States  the  Fed’s 
purchase  of a security  from  a dealer  immediately  pro- 
vides  the  dealer’s  bank  with  reserves.  By  contrast, 
in  Australia  the  dealer  receives  funds  immediately 
but  the  banking  system  only  acquires  funds  on  the 
next  day  when  the  dealer’s  check  clears. 
Most  of  the  open  market  operations  in Australia 
are defensive.  That  is, in order  to maintain  a desired 
interest  rate  the  central  bank  attempts  to offset  flows 
of funds  that,  by affecting  the  cash  position  of trading 
banks,  would  otherwise  cause  rates  to move.  For  con- 
ditions  that  are’deemed  to be  short-term  or seasonal, 
repurchase  agreements  are  frequently  employed, 
while  outright  purchases  and  sales  are  more  often 
used  to  offset  longer-term  market  conditions  that 
do  not  accord  with  desired  policy. 
Central  Bank Lending 
Another  major  way  for  the  banking  system  in 
Australia  to  acquire  exchange  settlement  funds  is 
through  loans  from  the  central  bank.  These  funds 
can  reach  the  banking  system  in two  distinct  ways. 
One,  called  a lender-of-last-resort  loan  (LLR),  is in- 
direct  and  occurs  through  a line  of  credit  extended 
to authorized  dealers.  The  other  is through  the  redis- 
counting  of  specific  Treasury  notes  at the  Reserve 
Bank.*  Rediscounting  is not  a loan.  However,  it  is 
analytically  equivalent  to  borrowing  at the  effective 
rediscount  rate  (defined  below)  for  the  remaining 
term  of  the  security  rediscounted. 
Lender-of-last-resort  loans  are  made  with  a term 
of 7-10  days.  The  minimum  term  is seven  days  with 
dealers  having  the  prerogative  of choosing  which  day 
they  will  repay  the  loan  (as  long  as  it  is repaid  by 
the  tenth  day). The  rate  on lender-of-last-resort  loans 
is usually  above  going  market  rates.  However,  since 
dealers  can  always  acquire  same-day  funds  by  bor- 
rowing  from  nonbanks,  dealers  will  borrow  only  if 
overnight  rates  are  expected  to  rise  to  the  level  of 
the  lender-of-last-resort  loan rate.  Also,  since  market 
rates  fluctuate,  the  LLR  rate  is adjusted  frequently. 
Because  an LLR  loan is for a minimum  term  of seven 
days,  the  decision  to  borrow  depends  not  only  on 
current  market  rates  but  on  expected  market  rates 
over  the  term  of  the  loan. 
With  respect  to  the  rediscounting  of government 
securities,  the  Reserve  Bank  stands  ready  to purchase 
securities  at  a price  P,  determined  by 
P  =  100  (1 -nr/365) 
where  r is the  rediscount  rate  and  n is the  number 
of  days  to  maturity  on  the  note.  As  Poole  (1981.) 
points  out,  this procedure  produces  an effective  redis- 
count  rate  of  r *  , commonly  known  as the  “give-up 
yield,”  given  by 
r*  =  (365/n)  ((loo-P)/P)  =  r  [l-nr/365]-*. 
This  formula  states  that  the  effective  rediscount  rate 
r*  is larger  than  the  discount  rate  r  and  varies  in- 
versely  with  the  number  of days  n to maturity  on the 
rediscounted  note.  Lie  the  LLR  rate,  the  redisc0un.t 
rate  is usually  above  the  market  rate.  The  pattern 
of  money  market  rates  is  shown  in  Chart  1. 
Borrowing  and  rediscounting  behavior  by  banks 
and  dealers  is depicted  in Charts  2a  and  2b  and  in 
Table  III.  The  data  show  (1)  that  large  volumes  of 
rediscounting  usually  occur  when  unofficial  market 
rates  slightly  exceed  the  rediscount  rate,  but  (2) that 
the  rediscount  rate  is usually  above  official  market 
rates.  The  behavior  of lender-of-last-resort  loans  is 
also  similar  with  dealers  borrowing  when  rates  are 
expected  to rise  above  the  LLR  rate.  These  lending 
methods  differ  significantly  from  the  operation  of the 
2 The  rediscount  facility  is  available  to  any  noteholder  but  is 
primarily  used  by  banks  and  authorized  dealers. 
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discount  window  in the  United  States.3  In the  United 
States,  discount  window  loans  are  usually  made  at 
a subsidized  rate.  Therefore,  controlling  their  volume 
involves  some  sort  of nonprice  rationing.  Since  redis- 
counting  involves  a penalty  rate  and  excess  same- 
day funds  are allowed  to earn  market  rates  of interest 
through  loans  to  dealers,  the  central  bank  lending 
facilities  in Australia  are quantitatively  less important 
than  those  in the  United  States.  Also,  bank  loans  to 
3 A  detaikd  analytical  treatment  of  the  discount  window  can  dealers  in Australia  are proportionately  greater  than 
be  found  in  Goodfriend  (1983).  excess  reserve  holdings  in the  United  States.  A large 
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INSTANCES  OF LARGE  REDISCOUNTINGS  FROM 
THE  RESERVE  BANK  (1986) 
Official  Unofficial 
Rediscount  Market  Market 
Date  Rediscounts  Rate  Rate  Rate 
l/17/86  63  19.0  18.7  19.0 
3/l l/86  115  18.0  17.5  17.9 
418186  85  16.5  16.3  17.8 
6110186  83  14.6  14.1  15.4 
l/ 16187  110  14.6  12.4  16.0 
quantity  of  these  loans  implies  that  a  substantial 
draining  of  reserves  would  be  required  in  order  to 
induce  banks  in  Australia  to  use  the  rediscount 
facility. 
Although  the  use  of  rediscounting  and  LLR 
facilities  may  not  be as great  as discount  window  use 
in the  United  States,  they  still strongly  influence  the 
behavior  of banks  and  dealers.  Since  these  facilities 
represent  a  cost  of  acquiring  same-day  funds,  the 
rediscount  rate  and  the  rate  on  LLR  loans  play  an 
important  role  in  determining  the  supply  of  bank 
loans  to dealers  and the  demand  for short-term  funds 
by  dealers.  In  essence,  the  penalty  rate  charged  for 
same-day  funds  represents  the  cost  of being  caught 
short  of those  funds  and  will therefore  be  an impor- 
tant  determinant  for banks  in deciding  how  much  of 
an inventory  of same-day  funds  they  should  maintain. 
III. 
The  Operating  Policy of the 
Reserve Bank  of Australia 
Before  investigating  the  general  operating  strategy 
of  the  Reserve  Bank  of Australia,  it is necessary  to 
look  at the  mechanics  of an open  market  operation. 
Doing  so will help  to  clarify  the  important  informa- 
tion  contained  in the  level  of bank  loans  to  dealers, 
information  similar to that  communicated  by the  level 
of discount  window  borrowing  in the  United  States. 
Open Market  Operations 
The  mechanics  of open  market  operations  can best 
be  illustrated  by  means  of  a  numerical  example. 
Suppose  that  the  exchange  settlement  accounts  of 
banks  have  a zero  balance  and that  banks  have  loans 
outstanding  with  dealers  of  $900  million,  Also, 
assume  that  taxes  of  $600  million  are  being  paid 
by  the  public  to  the  Treasury.  At  approximately 
9:30  a.m.  the  Reserve  Bank  announces  the  system’s 
opening  cash  figure  resulting  from  the  previous  day’s 
check  clearings.  In  this  example  the  figure  is zero. 
At  the  same  time,  the  Bank  also  indicates  its  deal- 
ing  intentions. 
As  mentioned,  banks’  loans  to  dealers  represent 
an inventory  of same-day  funds  available  to the  bank- 
ing system.  The  greater  this  inventory  the  lower  the 
probability  that  banks  will be  forced  to  rediscount 
government  securities.  Although  banks  are not  short 
of exchange  settlement  funds  today,  they  are  aware 
that  tax  payments  will  be  leaving  the  system  and, 
as  a  result,  they  will  have  a  cash  deficit  of  $600 
million  tomorrow  morning.  Reserves  leave  the 
system  because  the  Treasury  keeps  all  of  its 
accounts  with  the  Reserve  Bank.  Under  the  assump- 
tions  in  this  example,  banks  have  enough  loans 
outstanding  with  dealers  to  cover  the  shortfall,  but 
the  resulting  loss  in dealer  loans  would  certainly  be 
greater  than  banks  desire  at the  existing  interest  rate. 
Therefore,  individual  banks  will try  to  acquire  next- 
day funds  by bidding  for  deposits  or selling  securities 
to  dealers  or nonbanks  and  rates  will rise.  While  any 
one  bank  can  acquire  funds  in  this  manner,  the 
system  as a whole  can  only  acquire  funds  (1)  if the 
Reserve  Bank  provides  accommodation  by  buying 
securities  from  dealers,  (2) if dealers  finance  the  pur- 
chase  of securities  through  central  bank  borrowings, 
or  (3)  if someone  uses  the  rediscount  facility  of the 
Reserve  Bank. 
If the  Reserve  Bank  does  not  desire  any  upward 
pressure  on  rates,  it can  add  funds  today  and  allow 
the  system  to  transfer  the  funds  from  today  to 
tomorrow.  The  banks  and  dealers  will  make  such 
transfers  because  exchange  settlement  funds  do  not 
earn  interest.  For  example,  suppose  the  Reserve 
Bank  buys  $300  million  in  repurchase  agreements 
from  authorized  dealers.  Dealers’  exchange  settle- 
ment  accounts  will be  up  $300  million,  augmenting 
their  ability  to  purchase  interest-earning  securities 
from  nonbanks  (or  banks)  either  outright  or  under 
repurchase  agreements. 
Because  dealers’  accounts  are debited  (or credited) 
on  the  same  day,  their  exchange  settlement  funds 
will  now  be  square.  Nonbanks  will  deposit  the 
dealers’  checks  with  a  bank  and  the  funds  will  be 
credited  to the  banking  system’s  exchange  settlement 
accounts  on  the  next  day.  Therefore,  although  the 
accounts  of dealers  and  banks  at the  Reserve  Bank 
will not  change  as a result  of the  open  market  opera- 
tion,  float  will  increase  by  $300  million,  as  will 
deposits  held  with  the  banking  system.  In effect,  the 
$300  million  has  spilled  over  to the  next  day  so that 
banks  will  only  have  to  reduce  the  net  amount  of 
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million.  In this  case,  the  rise  in the  interest  rate  will 
be  lessened. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  if the  Reserve  Bank 
does  not  provide  additional  funds  on the  day that  tax 
payments  leave  the  banking  system,  bank  loans  to 
dealers  will  continue  to  decline.  As  a result  of  the 
tax payment,  banks  have been  forced  either  to reduce 
their  loans to dealers  by $300  million  or to rediscount 
$300  million  of  securities.  As  long  as the  effective 
rediscount  rate  is above  market  rates,  banks  will call 
in dealer  loans.  Calling in a dealer  loan results  in $300 
million  being  credited  to  the  banking  system’s  ex- 
change  settlement  accounts.  The  exchange  settle- 
ment  accounts  of dealers  are  now  deficient  by  $300 
million.  Dealers  must  either  take  out  an  LLR  loan 
or  sell  securities  from  their  portfolio.  The  sale  of 
securities  results  in immediate  credit  to  the  dealers’ 
exchange  settlement  account  even  though  the  check 
will not be presented  against the  banking  system  until 
tomorrow.  Float  is,  therefore,  negative  and  the 
system  has essentially  borrowed  money  from  the  next 
day.  On  the  next  day  the  check  clears  and  the  bank- 
ing  system  is  once  again  short  $300  million  and 
deposits  have  declined  by  $300  million.  The  pro- 
cess  will continue  until  banks’  loans  to  dealers  have 
been  driven  to  zero.  At this  point,  arbitrage  implies 
that  the  official  market  rate  will  have  reached  the 
effective  rediscount  rate. 
This  transmission  mechanism  is  quite  different 
from  that  in the  United  States.  In  the  above  exam- 
ple,  there  has  been  no  change  in  balances  held  at 
the  Reserve  Bank,  since  exchange  settlement  ac- 
counts  are virtually  zero-balance  accounts.  There  is 
negative  float,  but  the  change  in  the  portfolios  of 
dealers  and  the  banking  system  can  be  many  times 
the  initial  $300  million  withdrawal  of funds.  In  the 
United  States,  under  lagged  reserve  requirements, 
there  would  be  a  once-and-for-all  decline  in  free 
reserves  (excess  reserves  minus  borrowed  reserves) 
without  any  need  for  continuing  adjustments.  The 
monetary  base  in  the  United  States  would  have 
I  changed  by  $300  million  and  the  federal  funds  rate 
would  have  adjusted.  In Australia,  the  $300  million 
shortfall  appears  to  set  off  a  continual  adjustment 
process  without  any  continuing  changes  in  the 
monetary  base.  This  process  occurs  because  loans 
to  dealers  change  and  these  loans  represent  an  in- 
ventory  of  funds  that  allow  the  banking  system  to 
postpone  rediscounting.  In the  absence  of any  subse- 
quent  actions  by the peserve  Bank,  banks  eventually 
must  rediscount  to  keep  their  exchange  settlement 
account  from  becoming  negative.  In  U.S.  termi- 
nology,  holding  loans  with  dealers  is  analogous  to 
banks  postponing  the  need  to  satisfy  reserve  re- 
quirements  with  non-interest-bearing  reserves. 
There  is also a similarity  between  excess  reserves 
in  the  United  States  and  bank  loans  to  dealers  in 
Australia.  Both  assets  represent  a  source  of  same- 
day  funds.  In  Australia,  the  greater  the  spread  be- 
tween  the  effective  rediscount  rate  and the  overnight 
interest  rate,  the  greater  the  penalty  of being  caught 
short  of same-day  funds.  As a result,  banks  will make 
more  loans  to dealers  when  the  overnight  rate  is low. 
For  given  expectations  of future  open  market  opera- 
tions,  there  will be a strong  relationship  between  the 
amount  of  dealer  loans  and  overnight  rates. 
Although  the  preceding  example  emphasized  the 
difference  in the  transition  path  of bank  balance  sheet 
items  in Australia  and the  United  States,  the  steady- 
state  equilibrium  will be  the  same.  At  some  point, 
say with  a reserve  requirement  of  10 percent  and no 
currency  drain,  a $300  million  contraction  of  cen- 
tral  bank  liabilities  will lead  to  a $3  billion  decline 
in bank  deposits,  a corresponding  $300  million  fall 
in required  reserves,  and a $2.7  billion decline  in bank 
assets.  In  order  for  the  U.S.  system  to  follow  a 
transition  path  similar  to  that  followed  in Australia, 
the  Federal  Reserve  would  have  to vary nonborrowed 
reserves  so  that  excess  reserves  followed  a  quali- 
tatively  similar  path  to dealer  loans  in Australia.  The 
bizarre  nature  of  such  a  policy  is  one  reason  that 
the  Reserve  Bank  of  Australia  does  not  sit  on  the 
sidelines  for any extended  period  of time.  Protracted 
contractions  and expansions  of bank  loans  to dealers 
are  not  usually  allowed  to  occur. 
The  above  example  also  highlights  a  particular 
feature  of Reserve  Bank behavior  that  does  not  seem 
to be  fully  appreciated.  Specifically,  maintaining  the 
current  level  of  short-term  interest  rates  does  not 
imply  that  the  Bank  should  merely  offset  daily  injec- 
tions  of funds  into  the  system.  Since  bank  behavior 
in bidding  for funds  depends  on  the  expected  flows 
of  cash  over  subsequent  days,  the  Reserve  Bank’s 
operations  must  also  recognize  likely  flows  of  cash 
in the  future.  Otherwise,  needless  variations  in  in- 
terest  rates  would  arise.  Therefore,  to  ascertain 
whether  the  Reserve  Bank is seeking  to move  market 
rates  requires  a detailed  examination  not  only  of con- 
ditions  existing  on the  current  day but conditions  that 
are  liable  to  arise  in  the  near  future. 
The  one-day  lag between  transactions  that  provide 
exchange  settlement  funds  to  banks  reduces 
forecasting  errors  since  banks  start  each  day  with  a 
known  cash  position.  If interbank  settlement  were 
on  a same-day  basis,  the  Reserve  Bank  would  have 
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could  lead to larger swings in overnight  interest  rates. 
Of  course  there  is always  the  possibility  that  banks 
would  just  hold  additional  loans  with  dealers. 
However,  an  optimal  inventory  strategy  would  not 
cover  all contingencies.  Also,  the  ability  to  borrow 
and lend  across  days allows the  system  to adjust more 
gradually  to movements,  especially  temporary  ones, 
in  settlement  funds.  Given  that  the  Reserve  Bank 
is averse  to  sharp  swings  in  interest  rates,  this  is a 
desirable  characteristic.  In  the  United  States,  the 
regulation  that  banks  only  need  to meet  their  reserve 
requirements  on  average  has  much  the  same  effect. 
Although  the  accounting  procedures  in Australia 
provide  the  system  with  some  ability  to  adjust  to 
temporary  reserve  pressures  without  significant 
movements  in  rates,  a  concerted  effort  by  the 
central  bank  to  move  rates  will  result  in  a  gradual 
and  continued  change  in loans  to dealers.  In the  case 
of a tightening  in policy,  dealers  will be forced  to seek 
funds  by  borrowing  from  nonbanks  or  selling 
securities.  These  actions  place  upward  pressure  on 
rates.  Eventually,  the  necessary  exchange  settlement 
funds  can  only  come  from  two  sources,  lender-of- 
last-resort  loans  to  dealers  and  the  rediscounting  of 
government  securities. 
Reserve Bank Policy 
The  major  aim  of  the  Reserve  Bank’s  domestic 
market  operations  is to  maintain  the  official  market 
interest  rate  at a level  consistent  with  the  objectives 
of monetary  policy.  This  type  of policy,  which  uses 
the  interest  rate  as an operating  instrument,  has been 
implemented  since  the  floating  of the  exchange  rate 
in December  1983.  Note,  however,  that  while  the 
Reserve  Bank uses an interest  rate  instrument,  it does 
not  peg  the  rate.  Rather,  its policy  is similar  to  that 
of the  Fed.  The  Reserve  Bank basically  tries  to main- 
tain  interest  rates  within  some  desired  band.  Fluc- 
tuations  within  this  band  are  tolerated  while 
movements  outside  the  band  indicate  a change  in 
policy.  Band  widths  vary,  but  are  probably  on  the 
order  of  100-200  basis  points. 
The  daily  volatility  of  both  the  official  rate  in 
Australia  and  the  federal  funds  rate  in  the  United 
States  are displayed  in Tables  IV and V. The  measure 
of volatility  is the  average  squared  first  difference  in 
daily  rates.  Table  IV displays  this  measure  for selec- 
tive  sample  periods  chosen  so as to remove  the  con- 
taminating  influence  of a general  policy-induced  trend 
in  rates.  Table  V  reports  monthly  averages.  The 
message  of the  two  tables  is the  same.  Both  central 
banks  allow  daily  rates  to  fluctuate  and  the  amount 
of  fluctuation  is  roughly  similar.  Australian  rates 
showed  more  volatility  in  1984,  but  that  may  have 
been  due  to  a  learning  process  on  the  part  of  the 
Reserve  Bank  staff. Currently,  daily rate  movements 
are  on the  order  of 20-60  basis  points  in each  coun- 
try.  The  figures  on  daily  volatility  coupled  with  the 
large  amount  of  financial  churning  in  each  central 
bank’s portfolio  constitutes  strong  evidence  that  both 
monetary  authorities  are using  the  interest  rate  as an 
instrument,  but  that  the  interest  rate  is allowed  a cer- 
tain  amount  of  flexibility. 
As a practical  matter,  one  would  like to know  how 
the  monetary  authority  is  able  to  obtain  a  desired 
average  value  for  the  interest  rate  and  yet  allow  for 
daily  fluctuations.  One  would  also  like  to  know  the 
economic  effects  of this  type  of policy  as compared 
to  a policy  of adhering  to  an adjustable  interest  race 
peg.  In Australia,  policy  is achieved  by targeting  bank 
loans to authorized  dealers,  while in the  United  States 
the  Fed  targets  the  level  of borrowed  reserves.  As 
shown  below,  both  policies  are essentially  an indirect 
interest  rate  instrument  (see  also  McCallum  and 
Hoehn  (1983)  and  Dotsey  (1987a,b)).  In  practice, 
however,  if  hitting  the  targeted  level  of  loans  to 
dealers  forces  the  interest  rate  outside  its  pre- 
scribed  band,  then  the  target  is readjusted.  The  result 
is  a  discontinuity  in  policy.  Loans  to  dealers  are 
Table  IV 
VOLATILITY  IN  THE  DAILY  OFFICAL  RATE AND 
THE  DAILY  FEDERAL  FUNDS  RATE 
(Measured  by  the  average  squared  first  difference 
of  daily  rates  over  selected  sample  periods) 
Australian  Official  Rate 
July  2,  1984  -  Feb.  19,  1985 
Feb.  20,  1985  -  Apr.  1,  1985 
Apr.  2,  1985  -  Apr.  30,  1985 
May  1,  1985  -  Nov.  11,  1985 
Nov.  12,  1985  -  Feb.  24,  1986 
Feb.  25,  1986  -  Apr.  28,  1986 
Apr.  29,  1986  -  Jul.  28,  1986 
Jul.  29,  1986  -  Oct. 30,  1986 










U.S.  Federal  Funds  Rate 
Oct.  8,  1979  -  Jan.  31,  1983  .61 
Feb.  1,  1983  -  Feb.  29,  1984  .08 
Mar.  1,  1984  -  Dec.  31,  1984  .18 
Jan.  1,  1985  -  Jan.  30,  1987  .25 
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VOLATILITY  IN  THE  DAILY  OFFICIAL  RATE AND  THE  DAILY  FEDERAL  FUNDS  RATE 
(Measured  by  the  monthly  average  squared  first  difference  of  daily  rates) 













1984  1985  1986  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986 
3.10  .24  .04  .38  1.03  .27  .28  .06  .06  .03 
2.97  1.78  .08  1.59  .87  .45  .04  .02  .06  .Ol 
1.58  .34  .23  .56  .30  .37  .14  .13  .ll  .07 
1.16  .lO  .74  2.24  .60  .66  .17  .23  .06  .05 
.64  .16  .91  1.24  1.07  .17  .02  .21  .05  -01 
2.54  .73  .24  .54  1.11  .07  .16  .12  .05  .05 
.52  .50  .33  .18  1.21  .23  .04  .09  .lO  .04 
.68  .17  .29  .37  .72  .15  .02  .04  .06  .Ol 
.85  .25  .03  .29  .42  -36  .09  .14  .08  .05 
.47  .04  .02  .43  .54  .19  .06  .55  .09  .06 
.50  .33  .04  .73  .24  .05  .02  .05  .17  .18 
-72  .12  .03  1.55  .ll  .14  .13  .20  1.18  3.38 
Average  of  monthly  squared  deviations 
1.31  .40  .25  .85  .69  .26  .lO  .15  .17  .33 
only  used  as  a  guide  when  the  interest  rate  pro- 
duced  by  the  procedure  remains  within  specified 
bounds.  The  same is true  of a borrowed  reserve  target 
in  the  United  States. 
Modeling  this  type  of policy  discontinuity  would 
not  be  easy.  Nevertheless,  one  can  model  the  pro- 
cedures  that  span  it.  These  include  an interest  rate 
instrument  that  is varied  only periodically  and a policy 
of targeting  either  loans  to dealers  (Australia)  or dis- 
count  window  borrowing  (U.S.).  A model  of  those 
procedures  may  tell  us  something  about  the  effec- 
tiveness  of  monetary  control. 
therefore,  be  accomplished  through  the  interest  rate. 
This  rate  can  be  used  directly  as an  instrument  or 
indirectly  through  the  targeting  of  bank  loans  to 
dealers.  Although  actual  policy  does  not  exactly  con- 
form  to either  method,  these  methods  seem  to span 
policy.  Therefore,  an investigation  of the  effects  that 
market  structure  has on the  monetary-control  powers 
of a direct  versus  an indirect  interest  rate  instrument 
should  reveal  information  regarding  the  effectiveness 
of  actual  policy.  That  different  results  are  obtained 
for the  United  States  and Australia  shows  that  market 
structure  is relevant  when  analyzing  the  efficiency 
of  monetary  policy. 
IV. 
/ 
The  Market for Reserves 
The  Economic  Model 
Overview 
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  consider  the 
effectiveness  of  two  different  operating  procedures 
for controlling  money.  Given  that  the  Reserve  Bank 
employs  lagged  reserve  requirements,  the  basic 
instrument  of monetary  control  must  be  the  official 
market  rate.  With  lagged  reserve  requirements, 
today’s  required  reserves  are  based  on  last  period’s 
deposits  and  there  is no  way  for  current  policy  to 
affect  history.  The  control  of the  money  stock  must, 
Capturing  the  major  attributes  of  the  Australian 
money  market  in  an  analytically  tractable  manner 
requires  a degree  of abstraction.  It is, therefore,  im- 
portant  to  isolate  the  key  features  that  characterize 
the  market  for  reserves.  These  features  include 
(1)  the  presence  of  lagged  reserve  requirements, 
(2)  the  requirement  that  exchange  settlement  ac- 
counts  be  nonnegative,  and  (3)  the  intertemporal 
decisions  involved  in  rediscounting,  lender-of-last- 
resort  loans,  and bank  loans to dealers.  The  intertem- 
poral  nature  of  bank  behavior  can  be  illustrated  by 
assuming  that  the  average  maturity  of a rediscounted 
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central  bank  loans  to  dealers  are  assumed  to  be  for 
two  periods.  One  may  also  wish  to  think  of  the 
reserve  maintenance  period  as being  two  periods  in 
length,  although  this is not  crucial.  It will be evident 
that,  for  the  two  alternative  operating  procedures 
analyzed,  the  particular  reserve  accounting  regime 
is  irrelevant. 
The  Demand  for Money 
The  intuition  behind  the  results  concerning  the 
effectiveness  of  monetary  control  (as measured  by 
the  squared  deviation  of money  from  its target  value) 
can  be  understood  without  a detailed  description  of 
the  economy.4  Since  monetary  control  is  being 
examined,  it will be necessary  to discuss  the  demand 
for  money. 
The  real  demand  for  money  is  assumed  to  be 
positively  related  to  income  and  negatively  related 
to  the  nominal  interest  rate.  When  output  is high, 
individuals  tend  to  spend  more.  The  resulting  in- 
crease  in their  transactions  requirements  implies  that 
more  real  money  balances  are  desired.  Conversely, 
as nominal  interest  rates  rise  the  opportunity  cost  of 
holding  money  balances  increases  and  individuals 
economize  on  their  money  holdings.  The  demand 
for money  also depends  on a stochastic  element  that 
may  be  thought  of  as  representing  unobserved 
changes  in  transactions  costs  brought  about  by 
innovations  in  cash  management  procedures.  This 
random  element  is assumed  to  show  some  persist- 
ence  and  for  simplicity  is characterized  by  an AR1 
process.  That  is,  the  shock  to  money  demand,  xt, 
is equal  to  exrl  +vI,  where  0 < e <  1, and  v, is white 
noise.  This  means  that  any  current  disturbance  to 
the  demand  for  money  will  also  affect  the  future 
demand  for money,  although  the  effect  will dampen 
over  time.  Some  element  of  persistence  is needed 
to make  interesting  the  comparison  between  targeting 
loans  to  dealers  in  Australia  (borrowed  reserves  in 
the  United  States)  and  an  interest  rate  instrument. 
Otherwise,  an interest  rate  instrument  would  trivially 
dominate  the  loans-to-dealer  target  (and  similarly  a 
borrowed  reserve  target  in  the  United  States)  as  a 
means  of  controlling  money  (see  McCallum  and 
Hoehn  (1983)  and  Dotsey  (1987a,  b)).  An  AR1 
process  for the  money  demand  shock  represents  the 
simplest  way  of incorporating  persistence  and  allows 
the  analysis  to  proceed  at  an  intuitive  level.5 
4  For  a detailed  presentation  see  McCalhrm  and  Hoehn  (1983) 
or  Dotsey  (1987a,  b).  The  model  used  represents  a  closed 
economy.  Extending  the  result  to  open  economy  would  be  of 
interest  but  the  basic  mechanism  that  drives  the  results  does 
not  seem  to  be  sensitive  to  such  an  extension. 
5 A  degree  of  permanence  could  be  modeled  for  the  other 
variables  without  affecting  the  qualitative  results. 
An  Interest Rate Instrument 
One  basic  means  for controlling  money  is a policy 
of directly  using  the  interest  rate.  The  efficiency  of 
this  policy  is  measured  by  the  expected  squared 
deviation  of money  from  its target,  rnz The  targeted 
level  of  money  could  arise  from  some  complicated 
feedback  mechanism  on  past  and  expected  values 
of  various  economic  variables  that  are  chosen  to 
satisfy  broader  policy  objectives.  However,  the  ac- 
tual  choice  of m,‘is  not  crucial  (see  McCallum  and 
Hoehn  (1983)),  and for  simplicity  it is assumed  that 
the  targeted  level  of  money  is  a  constant. 
In  order  to  use  an  interest  rate  instrument,  the 
Reserve  Bank  would  peg  the  current  interest  rate  at 
a level  that  will produce  an expected  value  of money 
equal  to rn*T  Graphically,  the  demand  for money  can 
be  drawn  as a negatively  sloped  curve  with  respect 
to  the  interest  rate.  This  is depicted  in Figure  (la), 
where  rn: is the  expected  demand  for  money  based 
on past  information  that  includes  observations  on last 
period’s  economic  disturbances.  The  Reserve  Bank 
then  chooses  the  interest  rate  r,‘that  it  anticipates 
will equate  current  money  demand  with  its targeted 
value. 
If  the  economy  does  not  encounter  any  shocks, 
then  the  demand  for  money  will  exactly  equal  its 
target.  Disturbances,  however,  will generally  occur. 
For  example,  the  demand  for money  could  be  unex- 
pectedly  high  or there  could  be  a shock  to  aggregate 
supply  that  would  affect  income  and  consequently 
the  demand  for  money.  The  dashed  lines  in Figure 
(lb)  reflect  two  possible  demands  for  money  that 
could  occur  in  the  presence  of  unanticipated 
economic  disturbance,s.  If  the  demand  for  money 
were  unexpectedly  high,  then  actual  money  would 
be  rnf and  the  Reserve  Bank  would  miss  its  target. 
Similarly,  if money  demand  were  lower  than  antici- 
pated,  actual  money  would  end  up  lower  than  the 
target. 
Pegging  the  interest  rate  therefore  does  not  pro- 
duce  perfect  period-by-period  control  of the  money 
stock.  However,  since the  errors  in controlling  money 
are  not  systematic,  the  high  and  low  misses  will 
cancel  out  over  a long  enough  period.  The  same  is 
true  when  the  variable  targeted  is loans  to  dealers. 
Thus,  in  comparing  the  effectiveness  of  the  two 
operating  procedures,  one  needs  to  examine  the 
relative  variability  in money’s  deviation  from  target. 
Targeting Bank Loans  to Dealers 
Alternatively,  the  Reserve  Bank  could  attempt  to 
achieve  a  desired  level  of  money  by  aiming  at  a 
desired  level  of  bank  loans  to  dealers.  As  men- 
tioned,  this  variable  indicates  the  amount  of  same- 
day  funds  available  to  banks.  For  simplicity,  it will 
be  assumed  that  bank  loans  to  dealers  are  supply- 
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determined  with  dealers  accepting  any  amount  of 
loans  at the  going  rate.  Banks  hold  loans  with dealers 
because  funds  in exchange  settlement  accounts  do 
not  earn  interest.  The  inventory  of same-day  funds 
will be  based  on  the  cost  of running  short.  Specifi- 
cally,  if  a  bank  must  rediscount  a  two-period  se- 
curity  in order  to obtain  exchange  settlement  funds, 
the  cost  is the  effective  rediscount  rate  minus  the 
expected  yield  on the  security  rediscounted.  In order 
to  avoid  this  cost,  banks  will  have  a  well-defined 
demand  for  an inventory  of same-day  funds.  These 
funds  are acquired  by making  loans  to official money 
market  dealers.  As market  rates  rise  to  the  level  of 
the  effective  rediscount  rate,  there  is no  longer  any 
advantage  to holding  loans  with  dealers  since  redis- 
counting  no longer  involves  a penalty.  Therefore,  the 
supply  of  dealer  loans  is  indirectly  related  to  the 
offical  market  rate. 
Under  lagged  reserve  requirements  the  procedure 
of  targeting  banks’  loans  to  dealers  amounts  to  an 
indirect  interest  rate  instrument,  as  does  targeting 
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borrowed  reserves  in the  United  States.  This  can be 
seen  by examining  Figure  (Za). Figure  (Za) represents 
the  anticipated  supply  of loans,  dl”, as an inverse  func- 
tion  of  the  interest  rate.  As  interest  rates  rise  and 
approach  the  effective  rediscount  rate,  the  penalty 
associated  with  rediscounting  declines.  There  is, 
therefore,  less reason  for holding  same-day  funds  with 
dealers. 
How  should  the  Reserve  Bank  choose  a target  for 
dealer  loans,  dl:  given  that  it is interested  in achiev- 
ing a quantity  of money  equal  to  rn: ? As in the  case 
of  an  interest  peg,  the  Reserve  Bank  must  choose 
r,*in exactly  the  same  manner.  Then,  given  rZ it will 
choose  dl:at  a level  that  it  anticipates  will  be  con- 
sistent  with  r:  If there  are no economic  disturbances, 
using  open  market  operations  to induce  banks’  loans 
to  dealers  to  equal  dl: will result  in an  interest  rate 
of Cand  money  demand  equal to rn:: It is in this sense 
that  using  a reserve  instrument  amounts  to using  an 
indirect  interest  rate  target. 
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dealers  is also affected  by a random  component,  and 
that  no  other  random  disturbance  impinges  on  the 
economy  in  the  current  period.  In  this  case,  the 
actual  supply  of  loans  could  be  depicted  by  either 
of  the  dashed  lines  in  Figure  (Zb).  For  the  case  in 
which  the  supply  is unexpectedly  high,  maintaining 
the  reserve  target  at dl:results  in an interest  rate  of 
r: and  money  demand  of  m:.  With  no  disturbances 
to  money  demand,  aggregate  supply,  or  aggregate 
demand,  the  Reserve  Bank  would  still  miss  its 
monetary  target.  The  targeting  of  bank  loans  to 
dealers  would  be  unambiguously  worse  than  using 
the  interest  rate  directly  if there  were  no persistence 
in  the  economy.6 
To  see  how  persistence  can  potentially  alter  the 
analysis,  one  can  examine  the  case  of  a  positive 
money  demand  disturbance.  Individual  banks  will 
perceive  part  of  this  disturbance  by  observing 
movements  in  the  interest  rate  and  an  increase  in 
money  balances  in its depositors’  accounts  which  are 
positively  correlated  with  aggregate  movements  in 
money.  Because  the  money  demand  disturbance 
shows  persistence,  banks  realize  that  next  period’s 
demand  for money  will be  high and the  next  period’s 
interest  rate  will  have  to  rise  if the  Reserve  Bank 
expects  to achieve  its monetary  target.  An expected 
rise  in  the  interest  rate  will  lessen  the  expected 
opportunity  cost  of  rediscounting  securities  with 
maturities  of  two  periods  and  longer  and  will, 
therefore,  affect  this  period’s  supply  of  bank  loans 
to  dealers.  Given  the  structure  of  the  Australian 
market  for  reserves,  the  supply  of loans  will decline 
and  today’s  interest  rate  will  fall.  The  fall  in  the 
interest  rate  will work  to further  increase  the  money 
balances  held  by the  public  and exacerbate  the  devi- 
ation  of  money  from  target.  This  means  that  using 
bank  loans  to  dealers  is unambiguously  worse  than 
an interest  rate  instrument  for  controlling  money  in 
Australia. 
The  preceding  analysis  implies  that,  from  the 
standpoint  of monetary  control,  targeting  bank  loans 
to  dealers  is likely  to  be  inferior  to  an  interest  rate 
target  in Australia.  The  practical  importance  of this 
finding  is that  the  Reserve  Bank  of Australia  should 
be  more  concerned  with  the  interest  rate  than  with 
bank  loans  to  dealers.  When  applied  to  the  United 
States  the  results  may  be  different.  This  difference 
occurs  because  discount  window  borrowing  is 
generally  subsidized  and  thus  must  be  rationed  in 
some  way.7 Banks  attempt  to take  advantage  of their 
borrowing  privilege  when  rates  are  expected  to  be 
high.  In  the  case  of  a  partially  perceived  positive 
money  demand  disturbance,  banks  in  the  United 
States  (as  in  Australia)  expect  that  next  period’s 
interest  rate  will rise.  Assuming  an  unchanged  bor- 
rowing  (discount)  rate,  they  therefore  attempt  to 
postpone  borrowing  today  with  the  result  that  a 
higher  funds  rate  is  required  to  induce  them  to 
borrow  the  targeted  amount.  This  higher  funds  rate 
reduces  the  quantity  of money  demanded  and causes 
the  actual  level  of money  to be  closer  to target  than 
it  would  be  under  an  interest  rate  instrument. 
Targeting  borrowed  reserves  can,  therefore,  improve 
monetary  control  if the  demand  for borrowing  is not 
too  volati1e.s 
V. 
Summary 
This  paper  presents  a  comparison  between 
operating  procedures  and  money  market  institutional 
arrangements  in Australia  and the  United  States.  The 
conclusion  is that,  although  the  central  banks  of both 
countries  use  similar  operating  procedures,  differ- 
ences  in  institutional  structure  affect  the  relative 
efficiency  of policy.  The  most  important  institutional 
differences  are  the  administration  of  central  bank 
lending  and the fact that  official money  market  dealers 
bank  at the  Reserve  Bank.  The  use  of lagged  reserve 
requirements  in Australia  as opposed  to  contempo- 
raneous  reserve  requirements  is  not  an  important 
difference  under  current  operating  procedures.  The 
use  of an interest  rate  instrument,  either  directly  or 
indirectly,  makes  the  reserve  accounting  regime 
irrelevant.  Other  aspects  of the  money  market  such 
as different  rules  for  satisfying  reserve  requirements 
in Australia  and  the  United  States  are  likely  to  take 
on more  importance  under  contemporaneous  reserve 
requirements  and  reserve  targeting. 
6 Another  necessary  condition  for  a  reserves  instrument  to 
potentially  outperform  an interest  rate  instrument  is heterogeneity 
of  information  among  agents  (see  Dotsey  (1987a)). 
7 For  more  detail  see  Goodfriend  (1983). 
*  For  a more  complete  treatment  see  Dotsey  (1987a). 
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